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307 
PINKIE PROMISES OR BLOOD OATHS? USING 
SOCIAL CLAUSES IN U.S. FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS TO ERADICATE CHILD LABOR  
From north to south and east to west, child labor is a problem found 
around the world.1 Despite the international character of the problem, the 
causes of child labor are national.2 Since 1919, the United Nations has 
assisted the international community in identifying universal standards for 
labor rights and working conditions under the guise of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO).3 Weak enforcement has diminished the 
beneficial impact of the ILO’s child labor standards.4 In 1992, the United 
States began conditioning new free trade agreements upon adherence to 
certain child labor principles.5 These so-called “social clauses”6 in free 
trade agreements theoretically afford stronger enforcement of child labor 
standards in the form of trade sanctions.7 Despite these efforts, neither ILO 
standards nor U.S. free trade agreements have ended the worldwide 
exploitation of children for profit.8 
Assuming that social clauses in U.S. free trade agreements can reduce 
the rate of child labor, the United States must improve its social clauses in 
three ways. First, ineffective boilerplate conditions in social clauses must 
be replaced by clauses tailored to address the particular dynamics of child 
labor within the trading nation. Second, continued free trade privileges 
 
 
 1. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Child Protection from Violence, 
Exploitation and Abuse, http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_childlabour.html (last visited Nov. 
11, 2007) [hereinafter UNICEF Child Protection]. 
 2. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL TRADE, LABOUR AND HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (2000) 
[hereinafter GLOBAL TRADE]. 
 3. ILO, About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 
2007). The ILO is the United Nations agency which addresses social justice and equality in 
employment. Id. The ILO is the only agency created by the Treaty of Versailles still in operation. Id. 
 4. Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States’ Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Role, 11 
COMP. LAB. L.J. 48, 49 (1989); Phillip R. Seckman, Invigorating Enforcement Mechanisms of the 
International Labor Organization in Pursuit of U.S. Labor Objectives, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
675, 686, 689–90 (2004); Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 
14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261, 274 (2005). 
 5. See generally MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW 
THE DEAL WAS DONE (2000). 
 6. Federico Lenzerini, International Trade and Child Labour Standards, in ENVIRONMENT, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 287, 287 (Fredrico Francioni ed., 2001). A social clause 
is a provision or section in a trade agreement that is “aimed at conditioning the enjoyment of trade 
advantages by the respect of minimum international labour standards.” Id.  
 7. See, e.g., Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back—Or Vice Versa: Labor 
Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and 
Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 718 (2003).  
 8. UNICEF Child Protection, supra note 1. 
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should be conditioned upon a demonstrable reduction in child labor rates 
and should be tied to progressive, specific, and measurable goals for 
ultimately eliminating child labor. Third, and a necessary corollary to the 
second requirement, trading nations must be required to collect child labor 
data to facilitate the tracking of child labor rates.  
This Note contains four sections. First, it defines child labor and 
describes its national and international characteristics. Second, this Note 
reviews two strategies currently employed to eliminate child labor: the 
ILO’s international child labor standards and free trade agreements with 
social clauses. Third, this Note examines representative U.S. free trade 
agreements and their impact, if any, on child labor. And finally, this Note 
advances a proposal for improving social clauses in free trade agreements 
and discusses its possible pitfalls. 
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: CHILD LABOR 
For many, the mention of child labor elicits images of small children 
clad in rags and laboring under abhorrent conditions9 in developing 
nations.10 Such a stereotype, however, obscures the true range of situations 
where child labor occurs. Conversely, it would be overly inclusive to 
define child labor as all work performed by children.11 A properly 
inclusive definition, and the definition embraced in this Note, recognizes 
that child labor is all “work carried out to the detriment and endangerment 
of the child, in violation of international law and national legislation.”12  
 
 
 9. See, e.g., S. BETH ATKIN, VOICES FROM THE FIELDS: CHILDREN OF MIGRANT 
FARMWORKERS TELL THEIR STORIES (1993); TANYA ROBERTS-DAVIS, WE NEED TO GO TO SCHOOL: 
VOICES OF THE RUGMARK CHILDREN (2001).  
 10. Child Labour Does Not Need Exaggeration, AUSTL. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS NEWS (Defence for 
Children Int’l, Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 2001, at 1, 4 [hereinafter ASDCI] (observing that “child 
labour is being defined as a condition of what are termed ‘Third World’ countries”).  
 11. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE OF THE ILO, ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOUR 4 (Nelien 
Haspels & Michele Jankanish eds., 2000) [hereinafter ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOUR]. In fact, 
“[c]ertain kinds of work can have a positive impact on children’s development.” ROBERTS-DAVIS, 
supra note 9, at 5. 
 12. ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOUR, supra note 11, at 4. The ILO has published a more 
comprehensive definition of child labor, which  
includes both paid and unpaid work and activities that are mentally, physically, socially or 
morally dangerous and harmful to children. It is work that deprives them of opportunities for 
schooling or that requires them to assume the multiple burdens of schooling and work at 
home and in other workplaces; and work that enslaves them and separates them from their 
family.  
Id. 
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Although child labor is an international problem—an estimated 218 
million children were exploited worldwide as of November 11, 200613—it 
is caused by national and regional conditions. Specifically, poverty and 
substandard educational opportunities within a nation can increase the rate 
of child labor in any given nation.14 In addition to directly harming 
children,15 child labor leads to greater poverty, poorer educational 
opportunities, and greater human rights abuses.16 Child labor is an 
international problem that demands a timely solution. 
II. THEORETICAL AND APPLIED REMEDIES FOR CHILD LABOR 
For a program to succeed in eliminating child labor, it must be 
enforceable17 and address the country-specific causes of child labor.18 
World governments, non-government organizations, and international 
governing bodies, such as the ILO and UNICEF,19 have employed a 
 
 
 13. UNICEF Child Protection, supra note 1. 
 14. GLOBAL TRADE, supra note 2, at 19–20. In some cases, three year-old children have been 
required to assume responsibility for their own welfare because once “finished with breast-feeding, 
[they] became too expensive to feed.” JENS CHR. ANDVIG SUDHARSHAN CANAGARAJAH & ANNE 
KIELLAND, WORLD BANK, ISSUES IN CHILD LABOR IN AFRICA 19 (2001), available at http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/child_labor.pdf. See also Christopher M. Kern, 
Child Labor: The International Law and Corporate Impact, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 177, 182 
(2000). But see Sylvain Dessy & Stephane Pallage, Child Labor and Coordination Failures, 65 J. DEV. 
ECON. 469 (2001) (applying game theory to demonstrate that economic factors other than poverty 
make parents prefer employment of their children over education); CANAGARAJAH & KIELLAND, 
supra, at 7 (noting that poverty is not correlated with child labor rates in Africa because “most African 
child labor is not wage labor, but labor performed in the household”). In addition to poor schools, 
“cultural factors and norms . . . pull children toward the labor force.” Id. 
 15. See Kern, supra note 14, at 180. In addition to lacking the education necessary to have viable 
careers as adults, child laborers suffer from emotional pain and stunted development. Id. at 181. 
 16. GLOBAL TRADE, supra note 2, at 20. Amnesty International reports that “child labour is often 
a critical link in the cycle of deprivation and disadvantage that feeds other [human rights] abuses.” Id. 
This may be because child labor is typically performed to the exclusion of education, which is “a 
precondition for preparing children for working and living in a modern, market economy.” 
Canagarajah & Kielland, supra note 14, at 7. See also Robert A. Senser, How the Global Economy 
Promotes Child Labor, available at http://www.senser.com/clali.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) 
(“The global economy . . . is drawing more and more [children] into various types of servitude.”). 
 17. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, The “Helping Hand” in Trade Agreements: An Analysis of and 
Proposal for Labor Provisions in U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004) 
[hereinafter Pagnattaro, Helping Hand]. 
 18. ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOUR, supra note 11, at 10. The ILO believes that effective 
programs to eliminate child labor “must be country specific and be based on a genuine commitment 
from within the country to address the problem.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 19. UNICEF is the division of the United Nations devoted to child welfare. About UNICEF: 
Structure and Contact Information, http://www.unicef.org/about/structure/index.html (last visited Nov. 
11, 2007). As such, there is some overlap between the work of the ILO and that of UNICEF. Although 
the ILO is the agency primarily charged with overseeing international labor conditions, this Note 
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variety of techniques to eliminate child labor.20 Until relatively recently, 
such programs operated outside of the infrastructure of the international 
trade system because trade agreements were traditionally viewed as purely 
economic instruments.21 In 1992, the United States began conditioning 
new free trade agreements upon the adoption of certain standards for child 
labor.22 The differences between the ILO and U.S. approaches suggest the 
strengths of one are the weaknesses of the other.  
A. International Labor Standards and the ILO 
The ILO promulgates international labor standards, which are 
developed multilaterally by U.N. members.23 A country is only bound by 
those ILO conventions that it ratifies.24 Although the ILO is not the only 
U.N. agency to champion the rights of child laborers,25 it is the primary 
 
 
focuses on the work of the ILO. For a description of UNICEF’s recent work to eliminate child labor, 
see infra note 25. 
 20. Approaches to reducing child labor may be differentiated by their reach and scope. 
Unilateral or national strategies, which the United States increasingly favors, allow one country to 
apply its laws and or labor standards in another country. Christopher McCrudden & Anne Davies, A 
Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 179, 189 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001). An example of a unilateral strategy is the U.S. Alien 
Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which gives foreign workers standing to sue their employers in U.S. 
courts. Id. at 189. Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e, requires American 
companies to comply with U.S. labor laws even in foreign operations. Id.  
 In contrast, regional strategies involve agreement among a geographically defined group of 
countries to pursue similar child labor standards. Id. at 191. Free trade agreements represent regional 
strategies for eliminating child labor. Id. By leveraging free trade, one state may force another to 
improve its child labor laws. Id. Critics caution that regional solutions may fail if the trade agreement 
is poorly drafted. Id. 
 Finally, multilateral approaches are exemplified by international standards that are negotiated by a 
large number of nations and, in some cases, ratified by other nations. Id. at 191–92. ILO conventions 
and other U.N. actions are examples of multilateral approaches to curbing child labor abuses.  
 21. See, e.g., Kevin Kolben, The New Politics of Linkage: India’s Opposition to the Workers’ 
Rights Clause, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225, 244–45 (2006). Less developed nations worry 
that more developed nations will use trade sanctions for economic protectionism rather than to achieve 
social justice. Kimberly Ann Elliot, Peterson Institute, Preferences for Workers? Worker’s Rights and 
the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, Speech for the Faculty Spring Conference at Calvin 
College, Grand Rapids, Michigan (May 28–30, 1998), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/ 
papers/elliott0598.htm. In addition, “regional approaches may fragment the global trading system by 
grouping nations into trading blocs.” McCrudden & Davies, supra note 20, at 191. 
 22. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. President George H.W. Bush signed NAFTA in 1992. Jessica C. 
Lawrence, Chicken Little Revisited: NAFTA Regulatory Expropriations After Methanex, 41 GA. L. 
REV. 261, 270 (2006). 
 23. About the ILO, supra note 3. As a U.N. agency, the ILO ensures that each member nation 
has the opportunity to shape any standard announced. Id. 
 24. ILO, ILO Mandate, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/mandate.htm (last visited Nov. 
11, 2007); Pagnattaro, Helping Hand, supra note 17, at 847–48. 
 25. Most recently, UNICEF facilitated the signature, ratification, and accession of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/6
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agency to have done so.26 By “limit[ing] and delineat[ing] the decision-
making of corporate actors,” ILO conventions seek to prevent the fabled 
“race to the bottom.”27 The most recent ILO conventions to address child 
labor are ILO Convention No. 138,28 which specifies minimum age 
requirements for various types of work,29 and ILO Convention No. 182,30 
which seeks to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.31 Eighty-nine 
years after the first ILO convention on child labor,32 the exploitation of 
 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which addresses child labor both directly and indirectly. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc A/RES/44/25 (Sept. 2, 1990), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.pdf. Article 32(1) of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child declares “[T]he right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be 
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.” Id. art. 32(1). 
Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratifying nations must establish standards for 
minimum age, hours of work, and conditions of employment. Id. art. 32(2)(a) & (b). The Convention 
further requires “appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure . . . effective enforcement.” Id. art. 
32(2)(c). Other rights enumerated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child include protection from 
sexual exploitation (including prostitution and pornographic performance) (art. 34), protection from 
trafficking (art. 35), to education (art. 28), to rest and leisure (art. 31), and to “a standard of living 
adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development” (art. 27). 
 26. See, e.g., Guy Standing, Human Development, in CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? 72 
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2001). 
 27. Par Kamil Ahmed, International Labor Rights–A Categorical Imperative? 35 REVUE DE 
DROIT 145, 152 (2004). The proverbial race to the bottom occurs when corporations maximize their 
competitive edge and profits by exploiting cheap child labor and engaging in other labor abuses. Id. 
 28. ILO, Convention No. 138: Minimum Age, convened on June 6, 1973, available at 
http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/childlabour/c138.htm [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 138]. 
 29. Id. ILO Convention No. 138 determines minimum age requirements for work based on how 
strenuous the labor is. The minimum age for light work is thirteen years, but a country may reduce that 
age to twelve years if economically necessary. Id. art. 7. Similarly, the minimum age for most types of 
work is fifteen years, but may be set at fourteen years based on economic pressures. Id. art. 2. The 
minimum age for hazardous and unhealthy work is set at eighteen years and cannot be reduced for any 
reason by signatory countries. Id. art. 3. 
 30. ILO, Convention No. 182: Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, convened on June 1, 
1999, available at http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/childlabour/c182.htm [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 
182]. 
 31. Id. Article 3 of ILO Convention No. 182 identifies seven categories of work which comprise 
the worst forms of child labor. Id. art. 3. These are (1) slavery, (2) trafficking of children, (3) debt 
bondage, (4) forced labor, (5) prostitution, pornography and pornographic performances, (6) illegal 
activities including drug trafficking, and (7) any other “work which, by its nature or the circumstance 
in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of the child.” Id. When a nation 
ratifies ILO Convention No. 182, the ILO helps the nation develop policies and programs to address 
that nation’s specific challenges. Id. 
 32. ILO, C5 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, convened on Oct. 29, 1919, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (follow “C5” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) 
[hereinafter “ILO Convention No. 5”]. ILO Convention No. 5 restricted the work of children under the 
age of fourteen in certain industrial settings, such as mines and factories. Id. It was among the first 
group of conventions, all of which were adopted by the ILO on November 28, 1919. About the ILO, 
Who We Are: History, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 
2007).  
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children continues at an alarming rate.33 ILO conventions have been 
effective in defining universal minimum standards,34 but they lack the 
power to involuntarily bind nations. As a result, these conventions do not 
adequately compel change because of problems in application and 
enforcement.  
The ILO lacks the authority to require that all nations abide by the 
standards it promulgates. ILO conventions become binding upon a nation 
only upon voluntary ratification, and therefore do not apply to all 
countries.35 Those nations that have not ratified child labor conventions 
include not only impoverished nations in the developing world, but also 
Western nations with robust economies.36  
 
 
 33. UNICEF Child Protection, supra note 4. 
 34. See, e.g., Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap? in CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS?, 
supra note 26, at 43, 44. Because of their global nature, ILO conventions have the potential to 
universally improve the fairness of trade by reducing exploitative employment practices, especially in 
developing nations. Seckman, supra note 4, at 675. See also About the ILO, Who We Are: History, 
supra note 32. 
 35. See, e.g., Seckman, supra note 4, at 686. As of December 27, 2006, 165 countries had ratified 
ILO Convention No. 182. ILOLEX, Database of International Labour Standards, http://www.ilo.org/ 
ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm (follow “C182” hyperlink; then follow “See the ratifications for this 
Convention” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). Similarly, only 147 nations had ratified ILO 
Convention No. 138. Id. (follow “C138” hyperlink; then follow “See the ratifications for this 
Convention” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). See also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 36. See ILO, List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, available at http:// 
webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl (follow “by convention” hyperlink; then follow 
“C182” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) [hereinafter ILO Convention 182 Ratifications]; Id., 
available at http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl (follow “by convention” 
hyperlink; then follow “C138” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) [hereinafter ILO Convention 138 
Ratifications].  
 For example, neither Australia nor the United States has ratified the Minimum Age Convention. 
ILO Convention 138 Ratifications, supra. Australia showed a similar reluctance to ratify ILO 
Convention No. 182, which it finally ratified in 2006. ILO Convention 182 Ratifications, supra.  
 Although the United States has not ratified the Minimum Age Convention, it has regulated child 
labor since 1938 with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Fair Labor Standards Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 
201–219 (2006). FLSA both forbids the employment of children under the age of fourteen and limits 
the hours and types of work that may be performed by workers under eighteen years of age. Id. 
 In contrast, Australia lacks national child labor laws. See Patrick Parkinson, The Child Labour 
Problem in Australia, Defence for Children International—Australia (Sept. 2001), available at 
http://www.dci-au.org/html/parkinson.html [hereinafter Parkinson I]. Most child labor protections in 
Australia are found in narrowly-drawn state laws. Patrick Parkinson, The Child Labour Problem in 
Australia, AUSTL. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS NEWS (Defence of Children Int’l, Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 
2001, at 7 [hereinafter Parkinson II]. Australia’s failure to enact national legislation to prevent or 
regulate child labor has been strongly criticized. Parkinson I, supra. The American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) also criticized Australia for its reluctance 
to be bound by international labor standards. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), Labour Rights and Child Labour Laws in Australia 2 (Sept. 2, 2003). The 
AFL-CIO points out that, “[w]hile Australia is a developed country with a relatively high standard of 
living and a vibrant, independent labor movement, it also has an imbalanced, inadequate system of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/6
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Enforcement presents another series of problems for ILO conventions, 
which are all too often only ratified symbolically. Enforcement 
mechanisms in ILO conventions “rel[y] on moral force” rather than more 
tangible sanctions to elicit compliance.37 Such provisions are too weak to 
motivate ratifying nations to comply with international child labor 
standards.38 Even with stronger enforcement provisions,39 however, the 
ILO might nonetheless fail to impose stiff penalties on member nations for 
fear of losing international support and credibility.40 Without the authority 
to bind all nations to their terms and to enforce those terms, ILO 
conventions alone are unlikely to eliminate child labor. 
B. The Interaction Between Trade Liberalization, Free Trade Agreements, 
and Social Change 
International trade may offer an alternative strategy for reducing child 
labor and enforcing international child labor standards.41 Proponents of 
trade liberalization argue that both free trade42 and free trade agreements43 
 
 
labor laws that fails to fully protect workers’ core rights.” Id. For more discussion of child labor in 
Australia, see infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. 
 37. Schlossberg, supra note 4, at 49. 
 38. Seckman, supra note 4, at 686 (observing that “the ILO’s weak enforcement powers are a 
stumbling block for effective protection of all workers”); Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 4, at 274. 
 39. It has been suggested that enforcement of ILO conventions would improve if nations ceded 
to the ILO power akin to that given to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Seckman, supra note 4, 
at 693–98. Specifically, the WTO has the power to revoke trade concessions following an adjudicative 
decision that a state has violated a ratified ILO Convention. Id.  
 40. Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 4, at 274. 
 41. McCrudden & Davies, supra note 20, at 180–82. France and the United States initially 
lobbied to give the WTO the responsibility of enforcing international labor standards. Id. at 182. The 
history of the WTO and the decision to keep its functions separate from labor standards has been well 
developed elsewhere. See id. at 179–83; Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour 
Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT’L LABOUR REV. 565 (1987). 
The debate about whether the WTO is the proper entity to regulate international labor standards is 
similarly well developed on both sides. For an excellent discussion of the debate, see Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and the World Trade Organization, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 199–261 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001). 
 42. Free trade exists when “[t]rade within [a] group [of nations] is duty free but members set 
their own tariffs on imports from non-members.” World Trade Organization, WTO Glossary, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/free_trade_area_e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). 
 43. A free trade agreement is usually “a bilateral arrangement between two governments which 
provides for mutual removal of tariff and other trade barriers with respect to goods and services 
originating in the other country (party to the agreement).” Avraham Azrieli, Improving Arbitration 
Under the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement: A Framework for a Middle-East Free Trade Zone, 67 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 187, 192 (1993). Free trade agreements typically address the economic factors 
necessary to remove trade barriers, such as duties, customs, and quotas. See Rachel D. Edsall, Indirect 
Expropriation under NAFTA & DR-CAFTA: Potential Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public 
Welfare Regulations, 86 B.U. L. REV. 931, 932–33 (2006); Urs Gasser, Legal Frameworks and 
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can eradicate child labor. Right or wrong, U.S. trade policy embraces this 
theory.44  
1. Trade Liberalization and the Causes of Child Labor 
Free trade, theoretically, can alleviate child labor by eliminating its 
causes.45 More specifically, free trade reduces poverty and improves 
educational opportunities in developing nations by promoting economic 
growth.46 In turn, child labor becomes superfluous to the economic vitality 
of the family unit and subsequently disappears.47  
In practice, however, child labor persists despite extensive international 
trade liberalization. Like so many hypotheses, the prediction that free trade 
will reduce child labor breaks down when its necessary assumptions fail. 
First, the theory assumes that all members of a nation share in the 
economic boon of free trade.48 A nation’s poorest citizens, however, may 
never enjoy the economic benefits of free trade and instead remain 
 
 
Technological Protection of Digital Content: Moving Forward Towards a Best Practice Model, 17 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 39, 41 (2006) (noting that free trade agreements may 
include clauses aimed at protecting intellectual property); Lawrence, supra note 22, at 270 (discussing 
requirements “to reduce trade distortions and extend protections to foreign businesses and investors”); 
Marie Kately St. Fort, Note, A Comparison of the Rules of Origin in the United States, Under the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), and Under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 183, 183–84 (1994) (discussing rules of origin, quotas and tariffs in the 
context of free trade agreements). 
 44. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Mission of the USTR, http://ustr.gov/ 
Who_We_Are/Mission_of_the_USTR.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). The Office of the United 
States Trade Representative claims that free trade and free trade agreements can produce “higher 
living standards for families, farmers, manufacturers, [and] workers.” Id. 
 45. Thomas J. Manley & Luis Lauredo, International Labor Standards in Free Trade 
Agreements of the Americas, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 85, 87 (2004). But see Dexter Samida, 
Protecting the Innocent or Protecting Special Interests? Child Labor, Globalization, and the WTO, 33 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 411, 432 (2005) (suggesting that “[i]ncreased globalization has not been 
and will not be a major determinant of the prevalence of child labor”). 
 46. Manley & Lauredo, supra note 45, at 87 (observing that “[t]he macro-economic case for 
international trade liberalization is a powerful one. Trade . . . spreads the prosperity of productive 
employment.”). Jonathan B. Wright compared historical trade strategies and resulting economic 
strength to conclude that regions that have “a high index of openness to trade,” such as East Asia 
between 1965 and 1990, enjoyed high rates of economic development. Jonathan B. Wright, Does Free 
Trade Cause Hunger? Hidden Implications of the FTAA, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 167, 168 
(2001). In contrast, regions like Latin America, which attempted to replace imports with domestic 
industry, saw an increasing gap between the haves and the have-nots. Id. at 169. Regions with the least 
free trade, like sub-Saharan Africa, saw the lowest levels of economic development. Id. While 
conceding that “trade is [not] the only—or even the main—reason for the observed differences in 
economic growth rates,” Wright maintains that, a nation’s “openness to trade is most likely positively 
related to economic growth.” Id. 
 47. Manley & Lauredo, supra note 45, at 87. 
 48. Wright, supra note 46, at 168. 
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impoverished.49 Second, the theory assumes companies will not abase 
their employment practices in response to trade liberalization.50 
Unfortunately, free trade seems to encourage corporations to capitalize on 
the competitive advantage of cheap child labor.51 As a result, child labor 
probably will not be eradicated solely by liberalizing international trade.  
2. Free Trade Agreements and Child Labor 
Unlike trade liberalization, free trade agreements have the potential to 
eliminate child labor by conditioning a nation’s enjoyment of the 
economic bounty associated with free trade upon adherence to certain 
minimum standards for child protection.52 Free trade agreements have an 
advantage over ILO conventions in that economic considerations may 
motivate otherwise recalcitrant nations to bind themselves to minimum 
child labor standards.53 Additionally, free trade agreements offer more 
effective enforcement in the form of trade sanctions.54 
 
 
 49. Id. An equitable distribution of free trade proceeds may be possible if trade liberalization is 
accompanied by social and political reform. Id. Thus, “increased trade offers the promise, not the 
certainty” that economic growth will reduce child labor and other worker abuses. Harley Shaiken, The 
NAFTA, a Social Charter, and Economic Growth, in NAFTA AS A MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT: THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MERGING HIGH AND LOW WAGE AREAS 23 (Richard S. Belous & Jonathan 
Lemon eds., 1993). 
 50. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Third Annual Ruth Bader Ginsburg Lecture: The Global Impact 
of Feminist Legal Theory, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 307, 315 (2006); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, 
Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Provisions in CAFTA, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 386, 446 (2006); 
Paulette L. Stenzel, Plan Puebla Panama: An Economic Tool that Thwarts Sustainable Development 
and Facilitates Terrorism, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 555, 581 (2006). But see 
Samida, supra note 45, at 421 (noting that empirical research shows that “increased globalization has 
not led to an increase in the prevalence of child labor”); Robert C. Shelburne, An Explanation of the 
International Variation in the Prevalence of Child Labour, 24 WORLD ECON. 359, 374–75 (2001) 
(reporting an empirical study finding increases in per capita gross national product is not correlated 
with increases in child labor). 
 51. Abrams, supra note 50, at 315; Stenzel, supra note 50, at 318. 
 52. Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 287. 
 53. McCrudden & Davies, supra note 20, at 191. The formation of the European Union (EU), 
which was dependent upon improved labor protections within member nations, affords an excellent 
example of an effective social clause. Id. 
 54. Weiss, supra note 7, at 718. The dispute resolution process that precedes trade sanctions may 
be as powerful a motivating force as the sanctions themselves. Jack I. Garvey, Regional Free Trade 
Dispute Resolution as Means for Securing the Middle East Peace Process, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 
184 (1999).  
The argument here is that the construction and implementation of trade disputes resolution 
can affect the relationship of security and economic integration. Its potential lies in the 
capacity to capitalize on economic self-interest by deflecting, depoliticizing and dampening 
disputes, thereby diminishing contradictions between security and regional economic 
development. 
Id. But see Manley & Lauredo, supra note 45, at 113 (suggesting that the threat of trade sanctions 
“may in fact discourage use of the . . . dispute resolution mechanisms”).  
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In spite of their potential, free trade agreements imperfectly regulate 
child labor. Social clauses may conceal protectionist intentions and, 
therefore, be invalid trade practices.55 In addition, free trade agreements 
may not be specific enough to effect necessary changes in the content and 
enforcement of lax national child labor laws.56 The real Achilles’ heel in 
free trade agreements, however, is the practical problem of compliance 
and enforcement. Although free trade agreements are theoretically more 
enforceable than ILO conventions,57 eliciting actual compliance depends 
on political and economic circumstances. 
A country’s political and economic climate mediates the priority it 
places on complying with a free trade agreement.58 As governments 
change, so may a nation’s commitment to the free trade agreement and the 
child labor protections it mandates.59 In addition, a nation may not 
perceive trade sanctions as a real threat, especially when the United States 
is the enforcer. For one thing, trade sanctions “can be counter-productive 
in the trade regime,” which makes their imposition economically 
unappealing.60 Furthermore, other nations have good reason to doubt that 
 
 
 55. See, e.g., ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up 
(1998). The risk that a social clause will be labeled protectionist is sometimes expressly addressed in 
free trade agreements, such as the CAFTA-DR, which states “labor standards should not be used for 
protectionist trade purposes.” Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade Act ch.16, Aug. 5, 
2004, 43 I.L.M. 514. 
 56. Philip Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International Labour 
Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457, 458 (2004). In light of concerns about the specificity of labor 
standards contained in free trade agreements, the ILO’s recent shift away from specific, well-defined 
standards to general, undefined principles is troubling. Id. at 477. As a result of this shift, “the vast 
majority of ‘principles’ proclaimed by international legal instruments hold a status which is 
significantly lower in the normative hierarchy than that of a human right.” Id. Professor Alston has 
argued that the move from standards to principles “could be seen as a backward step, given that all of 
the relevant standards have long been recognized as human rights.” Id. For a contrary opinion, see 
Francis Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 1998 ILO Declaration for the 
Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 439 (2005). 
 57. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text for a theoretical examination of enforcement 
mechanisms in free trade agreements. 
 58. See Standing, supra note 26, at 77. Former Chilean president General Augusto Pinochet’s 
actions upon coming to power illustrate the impact of politics on labor conditions. Id. Upon taking 
office, Pinochet lowered labor standards and gutted labor organizations. Id. Then, “once workers’ 
organizations were enfeebled, [Pinochet] allowed modified freedom of association.” Id. at 77–78. 
 59. In 2006, many years after Pinochet’s removal from power, the United States Department of 
Labor reported that Chile was working diligently to reduce incidences of child labor. BUREAU OF 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S 2005 
FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 166 (2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/ 
media/reports/iclp/tda2005/tda2005.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DOL 2005 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS 
OF CHILD LABOR]. For more on child labor in Chile, see infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 60. Claire R. Kelly, Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 303, 
330 (2005). In addition, critics worry that increased acceptance and regulation of trade liberalization 
undermines the “normative function” of trade sanctions as “instruments used to promote international 
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the United States would impose trade sanctions for child labor abuses.61 
For instance, the United States has thrice withdrawn from the ILO62 and 
has refused to ratify certain ILO child labor conventions.63 Moreover, the 
United States reduced domestic enforcement of its own child labor laws 
repeatedly between 2001 and 2005.64 Finally, the United States’ 
reservation of trade sanctions for only the most egregious violations 
militates against the risk that the U.S. will impose trade sanctions for child 
labor abuses.65 
Notwithstanding these flaws, free trade agreements are a viable 
regional strategy for eliminating child labor.66 As regional remedies, free 
trade agreements exchange the potential for effecting the sweeping, 
international change of ILO conventions for the more certain results of a 
program adapted to the relevant national causes of child labor.67 
III. UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: A SELECTIVE REVIEW 
U.S. foreign policy reflects a “reluctan[ce] to conclude trade and 
investment agreements with States” that do not uphold certain labor 
standards.68 For the past fifteen years, the United States has included in its 
 
 
rights compliance.” Cleveland, supra note 41, at 201. For instance, WTO trade policies may limit an 
individual nation’s ability to levy trade sanctions for human rights violations. Id. 
 61. See GLOBAL TRADE, supra note 2, at 54. Specifically, “[t]he double standards displayed by 
the USA on the issue of human rights and labour standards has been a major reason why many 
observers have viewed its promotion of a social clause in trade agreements with such distrust.” Id. 
 62. Ahmed, supra note 27, at 161. The United States was not part of the ILO from 1919 to 1934, 
1938 to 1944, nor 1977 to 1980. Id. Some believe that the United States uses the threat of withdrawal 
to compel favorable ILO policies. Id. at 162 (citing Drusilla K. Brown, International Labor Standards 
in the World Trade Organization and the International Labor Organization 3 (Dec. 1999)(Working 
Paper, on file with Tufts University)). 
 63. ILO Convention 138 Ratifications, supra note 36. 
 64. The Government’s Striking Decline in Child Labor Enforcement Activities, A Child Labor 
Coalition Report 2 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.stopchildlabor.org/pressroom/CLC% 
20report%20Sept%202006.pdf.  
 According to the Child Labor Coalition, the United States Department of Labor (DOL) reduced 
the number of child labor investigators from about forty-three full time employees in 2001 to just 
twenty-three full time employees in 2005. Id. Although the actual rate of child labor in the United 
States is unknown because the U.S. neither collects nor reports statistics on illegal domestic child 
labor, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that approximately 134 American workers under 
fourteen years of age were killed on-the-job between 1992 and 1998. Id. at n.8. 
 65. See Larry Luxner, Sprint Hangs Up on Workers, 17 Multinational Monitor No. 3 (Mar. 
1996), available at http://multinationalmonitor.org/hypermm0396.03.html. 
 66. McCrudden & Davies, supra note 20, at 189.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Ahmed, supra note 27, at 151. See also CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 5, at 180. In 1997, 
the United States Congress signaled its commitment to using trade, free and otherwise, to prevent child 
labor when it amended the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307, to forbid the import of goods 
manufactured by “forced or indentured child labor.” Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 297. 
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free trade agreements social clauses “aimed at conditioning the enjoyment 
of trade advantages [on] respect [for] minimum international labour 
standards,” including those directed at child labor.69 The first such 
agreement was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).70 
NAFTA dealt with child labor in a side agreement, the North American 
Agreement on Labor Conditions (NAALC).71 When NAALC failed to 
have the desired effect on child labor rates in Mexico, the United States 
responded by trying to improve the social clauses it negotiated.72 The final 
text of the 2006 Andean Trade Promotion Agreement (ATPA) signals that 
the period of innovation has ended, ushering in the era of boilerplate social 
clauses.73 
A. NAFTA and NAALC 
When Bill Clinton won the presidency in 1992, his predecessor, 
President George H. W. Bush, had almost completed negotiations for free 
trade with Canada and Mexico.74 The text of NAFTA reflects the United 
States’, and specifically the first Bush Administration’s, perception of free 
trade as a means to an economically beneficial end.75 President Bush 
 
 
 69. Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 287. 
 70. NAFTA, supra note 22. Finalized in 1992, NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. Id. 
art. 2203. 
 71. North American Agreement on Labor Conditions, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 
1499 (1993) available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml [hereinafter NAALC]. 
 72. Weiss, supra note 7, at 717. 
 73. The Andean Trade Promotion Agreement (ATPA) is a composite agreement, made up of 
both the Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, __ U.S.T. ___ 
[hereinafter CTPA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/ 
Final_Text/Section_Index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008), and the Peru Trade Promotional 
Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, __ U.S.T. ___ [hereinafter PTPA], available at http://www. 
ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2008). 
 74. CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 5, at 182. 
 75. See The Clinton Administration, The NAFTA: Expanding U.S. Exports, Jobs and Growth, 
Clinton Administration Statement on the North American Free Trade Agreement, PrEx 1.2: N 82 (July 
1993) [hereinafter Clinton Administration Statement on NAFTA]. 
 Although NAFTA was driven by economic considerations, the United States, and particularly the 
Clinton Administration, also saw free trade with Mexico as a way to reduce illegal immigration and 
drug trafficking. Wright, supra note 46, at 168. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State in the Clinton 
Administration, testified before Congress that “a growing Mexico economy . . . will be very helpful in 
reducing . . . illegal immigration.” The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Hearings 
before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong. 5 (1993) (statement of Warren Christopher, 
Secretary of State). See also Clinton Administration Statement on NAFTA, supra, at 4 (“NAFTA will 
gradually ease many of the pressures in Mexico that currently contribute to illegal immigration.”). The 
Clinton Administration also claimed that NAFTA would foster a positive atmosphere for bilateral 
efforts to fight the drug trade. Id. at 11.  
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signed NAFTA in December 1992 and, by the time President Clinton took 
office, it was too late to re-open the negotiations to address the new 
administration’s concerns about labor conditions.76 Fearing a political 
stalemate in the congressional ratification process, the three countries 
agreed to negotiate a side agreement to address labor standards.77 On 
September 13, 1993, the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed 
NAALC, which purported to bind all three nations to certain minimum 
standards for child labor.78  
1. Child Labor Prohibitions in NAALC 
NAALC, which does not identify specific substantive requirements for 
child labor protections, has been criticized for being “too weak [and] 
poorly designed.”79 In lieu of specific standards, NAALC lists eleven 
principles to guide each nation’s government.80 One of the principles calls 
 
 
 76. CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 5, at 182. 
 77. See generally Solidaridad de la Maquila, What is the North American Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation?, available at http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/en/issues/trade/nafta/naalc (last visted Jan. 
23, 2008); CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 5.  
 Even before President Clinton was sworn in, the first Bush Administration considered the 
possibility of addressing labor conditions in a side agreement. In its report to President Bush, the U.S. 
Labor Policy Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations (“Labor Policy Advisory Committee”) 
scorned such an approach because the enforcement provisions in such side agreements would not 
include trade sanctions. The Report of the Labor Policy Advisory Committee for Trade on the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, Pr. Ex. 1.2:T67/3/LAC (Sept. 15, 1992) at 4. The Labor Policy 
Advisory Committee complained that the Administration’s “Action Plan is nothing more than a list of 
promises.” Id.  
 Trade sanctions were ultimately built into the enforcement provisions, but may only be levied if 
deemed appropriate by the three member nations. Id. See also NAFTA, supra note 22. 
 78. NAALC, supra note 71. NAALC created the North American Commission on Labor to 
“Foster discussion and better appreciation of worker rights and labor standards in each NAFTA 
country; Encourage domestic enforcement of national labor laws; and Promote the raising and 
strengthening of labor standards in North America.” The Report of the Labor Policy Advisory 
Committee for Trade on the North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at 8. The Clinton 
Administration cautioned that, despite the promise inherent to NAALC, the agreement “cannot resolve 
overnight all . . . labor problems.” Id.  
 79. Kolben, supra note 21, at 232.  
 80. NAALC, supra note 71. NAALC defines labor laws as those relating to: 
(a) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; (b) the right to bargain 
collectively; (c) the right to strike; (d) prohibition of forced labor; (e) labor protections for 
children and young persons; (f) minimum employment standards, such as minimum wages 
and overtime pay, covering wage earners, including those not covered by collective 
agreements; (g) elimination of employment discrimination on the basis of grounds such as 
race, religion, age, sex, or other grounds as determined by each Party’s domestic laws; (h) 
equal pay for men and women; (i) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; (j) 
compensation in case of occupational injuries and illnesses; [and] (k) protection of migrant 
workers. 
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for the eradication of child labor.81 NAALC encourages enforcement of 
national laws that comport with its eleven stated principles.82 In order to 
preserve national sovereignty, the NAALC principles were tied neither to 
international labor standards nor to international law.83 NAALC 
established a diplomatic and consensus-based dispute resolution and 
enforcement system.84 A complaining nation may levy appropriate trade 
sanctions against either the United States or Mexico, but only if the 
offending nation fails to remedy the problem or to pay a monetary 
enforcement fine.85 Canada is exempt from these trade sanctions.86 
2. NAALC’s Failure to Eliminate Child Labor in Mexico 
Although NAALC was initially greeted with optimism,87 it failed to 
reduce child labor rates.88 Child labor remains a significant problem in 
Mexico89 due, in part, to pervasive poverty in some Mexican 
 
 
NAALC, art. 49(1)(b), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement7.shtml (last visited Nov. 
11, 2007). A detailed description of the eleven NAALC labor principles can be found in NAALC 
Annex 1 (“Labor Principles”), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement9.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2007). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. See also The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Hearings before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong. 10 (1993) (statement of Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the 
Treasury) (testifying, before NAFTA became operable, that “Mexico has good, strong labor laws but 
enforcement has been a problem”). 
 83. GLOBAL TRADE, supra note 2, at 52–53. 
 84. NAALC, Part 5, available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement6.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2007). NAALC relies upon an arbitration board to make findings of fact and to determine 
whether there was a violation of “occupation safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical 
labor standards in a manner that is trade-related and covered by mutually recognized laws.” NAALC, 
Part 5, art. 36(2). If it finds a violation, the arbitration panel may recommend a remedy. Id. The 
ultimate resolution of the dispute, however, is left to the parties themselves. NAALC, Part 5, art. 38.  
 85. NAALC, Part 5, art. 41. NAFTA trade benefits may only be revoked if the arbitral panel is 
unsuccessfully reconvened for the purpose of forcing the renegade party to comply with specific labor 
standards. Id.  
 86. Canada has ensured it will never be subjected to trade sanctions for labor violations by 
making any NAALC fines enforceable through Canadian courts, thus abrogating the need for 
additional sanctions. NAALC, Annex 41A. 
 87. See, e.g., The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Hearings before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong. 26 (1993) (answer of Warren Christopher, Secretary of State) 
(“I think our judgment . . . is that the trend [in Mexican human rights] is positive. I think that positive 
trend will be encouraged rather than discouraged by the approval of NAFTA.”); Shaiken, supra note 
49, at 25. (“It is clear that if Mexico manages its resources correctly, it could become a high-tech, 
export-oriented manufacturing base—a possibility that offers considerable promise for 
development.”). 
 88. See David Bacon, The Children of NAFTA: Labor Wars on the U.S./Mexico Border 32 
(2004); Joshua Briones, Student Scholarship: Paying the Price for NAFTA: NAFTA’s Effect on Women 
and Children Laborers in Mexico, 9 U.C.L.A. WOMEN’S L.J. 301 (1999). 
 89. According to UNICEF, sixteen percent of Mexican children between the ages of five and 
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communities.90 Mexican child labor also thrives because Mexico too 
seldomly enforces its excellent labor laws.91 NAALC’s enforcement 
provisions are too weak to compel Mexico to enforce its laws,92 partially 
because NAALC bound all three countries to easily erodable principles.93 
NAALC’s non-adjudicatory enforcement system does not motivate 
participant nations, in particular Mexico, to fulfill their child protection 
obligations.94 First, NAALC protections are limited almost exclusively to 
unionized workers,95 but most children work in non-unionized jobs like 
domestic servitude.96 Second, the costs of adjudication may deter those 
children who do have standing from asserting their rights under NAALC.97 
Third, children, especially those who leave school to work at an early age, 
may not be capable of notifying participant nations of abuses because they 
lack the resources and skills to communicate with foreign leaders.98 
Finally, trade sanctions may only be imposed if systemic noncompliance is 
found, all but eliminating the most powerful incentive for actively 
combating child labor.99 
 
 
fourteen years were engaged in child labor between 1999 and 2005. UNICEF, At a Glance: Mexico—
Statistics, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/mexico_statistics.html#30 (last visited Nov. 11, 2007); 
UNICEF The State of the World’s Children 2006 130 (2005), available at http://www.unicef.org/ 
publicatoins/files/SOWC_2006_English_ Report_rev(1).pdf. See also Briones, supra note 88, at 309 
(estimating that five million Mexican children are employed in violation of NAFTA and NAALC). 
Figures for the United States and Canada are not available from UNICEF.  
 90. Bacon, supra note 88, at 35, 215. In his 2004 exposé of NAFTA’s impact on laborers, David 
Bacon noted that “the Mexican government’s Secretariat of Labor and Social Forecasting estimates 
that eight hundred thousand children under the age of fourteen work in different sectors of the 
economy.” Id. at 33. 
 91. Briones, supra note 88, at 309. Mexican law prohibits employment of children who are under 
fourteen years of age. Id. (citing Ley Federal de Trabajo (The Federal Labor Law), Tomo CCXCIX, 
No. 26 (1970)).  
 92. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 702–11; Manley & Lauredo, supra note 45, at 105. 
 93. Weiss, supra note 7, at 704.  
 94. Bacon, supra note 88, at 32. In 1996, human rights workers in the Mexicali Valley tried to 
organize workers to put pressure on the Mexican government to enforce child labor laws in onion 
fields. Id.  
 95. Briones, supra note 88, at 319. 
 96. SweatShop Watch, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/index. 
php?s=18 (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) (“Even those who find jobs in favorable working conditions are 
outside the social safety nets of family, school, trade union, employment or welfare laws.”). 
 97. Juan de Nigris, Trade Liberalization and Mexico, in NAFTA AS A MODEL OF 
DEVELOPMENT: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MERGING HIGH AND LOW WAGE AREAS 165 (Richard 
S. Belous & Jonathan Lemco eds., 1993). 
 98. See Briones, supra note 88, at 320. Practical considerations may impair the ability of a child 
to draw another nation’s attention to child labor abuses. Id. For example, “[a] woman or child who 
earns less than thirty-five cents an hour does not have the money he/she needs to eat, much less the 
money to travel across international borders to complain about his/her employers.” Id.  
 99. Id. at 321. The high standard delineated by NAALC, “that enforcement officials abused their 
discretion and that the decision not to enforce compliance was due to factors other than a reasonable 
decision regarding allocation of resources,” makes it still more difficult to initiate trade sanctions. Id. 
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Other problems with NAALC stem from the treaty’s reliance on 
principles rather than on specific, quantifiable standards and time-
measured goals.100 NAALC may also have resulted in poorer working 
conditions by obviating some of Mexico’s best labor laws.101 Problems 
both with NAALC’s enforcement and substance continue to harm 
Mexico’s children. 
B. Three Rounds of Post-NAFTA Social Clauses 
In the fifteen years since NAFTA was signed, the United States has 
entered into free trade agreements with a number of countries, including 
Jordan, Chile, and Australia.102 Each agreement contains a social clause 
that specifically addresses child labor. Early on, the United States tried to 
improve the social clauses it negotiated in response to NAALC’s failure to 
curb child labor in Mexico.103 In the latest proposed free trade agreement, 
the ATPA, such innovation has all but ceased. 
1. Round One: Jordan104 
In 2000, the United States signed a free trade agreement with the 
Republic of Jordan.105 In many respects, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement resembles NAFTA and NAALC. For instance, the majority of 
the agreement focuses on traditional trade issues, such as customs and 
 
 
(citing Stephen F. Diamond, Labor Rights in the Global Economy: A Case Study of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
216–18 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996)). Under NAALC, the mere knowledge of 
an incident of child labor is insufficient to activate trade sanctions. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Manley & Lauredo, supra note 45, at 104.  
 101. Michael Joseph McGuinness, The Politics of Labor Regulation in North America: A 
Reconsideration of Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 3 (2000). 
 102. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). 
 The only U.S. free trade agreement to predate NAFTA is the United States’ agreement with Israel, 
which was finalized in 1985. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area between the 
Government of Israel and the Government of the United States of America, U.S.-Isr. Apr. 22, 1985, 
KAV 973, available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trader_Agreements/All_TraderAgreements/exp_ 
005439.asp. The United States–Israel Free Trade Agreement is a purely economic instrument and does 
not include a social clause. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 7, at 717. 
 104. Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on 
the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, KAV 5970, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_5112.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement].  
 105. Id. at 19.  
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duties.106 Moreover, both agreements preserve national sovereignty by 
requiring the nations to enforce their existing laws rather than mandating 
improvement of child labor laws.107 Also, both the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement and NAALC state that, in principle, the two nations will work 
to eliminate domestic child labor, but neither agreement requires actual 
progress towards that goal.108 
Despite the many similarities between the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement and NAALC, variations in the later agreement were “intended 
to serve as a response to widespread criticism of the NAALC.”109 The 
most obvious difference between the two agreements is formalistic. Child 
labor is addressed in a social clause in the body of the U.S.-Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement, while NAALC was a side agreement to a free trade 
agreement.110 Substantively, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement also 
differs from NAALC in that it includes an anti-degradation clause111 and 
creates a more agile enforcement scheme.112 
The anti-degradation clause in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement 
enjoins the parties from relaxing existing legal protections against child 
labor to leverage a trade advantage.113 In contrast, NAALC undermined 
some of Mexico’s worker protection laws.114 The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement also suggests that national laws should comport with 
 
 
 106. See, e.g., Grace V. Chomo, Free Trade Agreements between Developing and Industrialized 
Countries: Comparing the U.S.-Jordan FTA with Mexico’s Experience under NAFTA (U.S. 
International Trade Comm’n, Office of Economics, Working Paper No. 2002-01-B, Jan. 2002), 
available at http://hotdocs.usite.gov/docs/pubs/research_working_papers/EC200201B.PDF. 
 107. See U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 104, art. 6, §§ 3–4. Deference to national 
sovereignty is taken a step further in section 4(b), which allows either party to not enforce labor laws 
“where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a 
bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources.” Id. 
 108. Id. The only place where specific workers’ rights are addressed is in the definition of “labor 
laws,” which may include those “statutes and regulations” addressing “a minimum age for the 
employment of children.” Id. The looseness of this language would probably permit Jordan to elect not 
to enact minimum age laws or, alternatively, to set a minimum age requirement so low that child 
protection is merely illusory.  
 109. Weiss, supra note 7, at 717. 
 110. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 104, art. 6. See also Weiss, supra note 7, at 
713–14. 
 111. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 104, art. 6(2). 
 112. Id. art. 17. 
 113. Id. art. 6(2). Specifically,  
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing domestic labor 
laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise 
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws as an encouragement 
for trade with the other Party.  
Id. In addition, the agreement requires both the United States and Jordan to “effectively enforce [their] 
labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction.” Id. art. 6(4)(a). 
 114. McGuinness, supra note 101, at 3. 
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international labor standards, including ILO Conventions,115 without 
regard for national sovereignty.116  
The dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms in the U.S.-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement also differ from those in NAALC.117 Specifically, 
disputes between the parties are initially resolved through non-binding 
adjudication.118 If a dispute is not resolved quickly enough, the offended 
party may impose “any appropriate and commensurate measures,” 
including trade sanctions.119  
Eight years after the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement became 
effective, there is no way to know whether child labor rates have 
increased, decreased, or remained the same. Jordanian child labor statistics 
are nonexistent120 and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement does not 
require the collection of such data. The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement’s impact on child labor might alternatively be deduced from 
developments in Jordanian child labor law after the free trade agreement 
went into effect. Although Jordan has complied with the agreement’s anti-
degradation clause, it has not enacted stricter child labor laws in the years 
since it signed the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement.121 Although 
 
 
 115. Id.; U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 104, art. 6(3). 
 116. Id. The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement limits the role of international child labor law to 
that of establishing “a floor for substantive norms, which should be provided under domestic law. 
Domestic law provides the benchmark for effective enforcement and anti-relaxation, the two most 
readily enforceable obligations.” Weiss, supra note 7, at 716. 
 117. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 718. Although this Note treats these changes as potentially 
beneficial, not everyone agrees. Marley S. Weiss has questioned the efficacy of enforcement 
mechanisms in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, observing that the agreement lacks “NAALC 
type due process, access to the tribunal, and other labor law procedural commitments.” Id. 
 118. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 104, art. 17. Under the U.S.-Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement, disputes between the parties are reviewed by a three-member dispute settlement 
panel. Id. Each country selects one of the panel members; the third member, the chairperson, is jointly 
appointed by the two nations. Id. 
 119. Id. art. 17(2)(b). The vagueness of this provision calls into question the likelihood that trade 
sanctions ever could be imposed for child labor violations. 
 120. The ILO estimated that, in 2002, less than one percent of ten to fourteen year-olds living in 
Jordan were engaged in child labor. BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S 2004 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 
253 (2005), available at http://dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/tda2004/tda2004.pdf (last visited Nov. 
11, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. DOL 2004 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR]. In 2005, 
however, the United States Department of Labor International Affairs Division reported that the rate of 
child labor in Jordan is unknown. U.S. DOL 2005 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR, 
supra note 59, at 259. 
 121. In 1996, four years before the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement was finalized, Jordan 
raised the minimum working age from thirteen to sixteen. U.S. DOL 2005 FINDINGS ON THE WORST 
FORMS OF CHILD LABOR, supra note 59, at 261. In 2003, Jordan similarly raised the minimum 
working age for hazardous jobs from seventeen to eighteen years. U.S. DOL 2004 FINDINGS ON THE 
WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR, supra note 120, at 254. The operation of the U.S. Free Trade 
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Jordanian officials investigated approximately three thousand claims of 
child labor in 2002, none of the employers were sanctioned in accordance 
with Jordanian law.122 Thus, the effectiveness of the U.S.-Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement as a tool for eliminating child labor in that country is 
questionable. 
2. Round Two: Chile123 and Australia124 
In 2003 and 2004, the United States finalized free trade agreements 
with Chile and Australia, respectively.125 The differences between the 
2003 and 2004 agreements and their predecessors underline the United 
States’ ongoing attempts to find better ways to address child labor without 
impairing the sovereignty of the participant nations.126  
Working conditions are addressed through virtually identical social 
clauses in the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreements.127 
The social clauses continue the trend of addressing child labor with greater 
specificity, yet neither agreement identifies specific or measurable 
standards for child labor.128 For instance, both agreements specifically 
refer to ILO Convention No. 182 (worst forms of child labor) more as a 
principle to be borne in mind when governing than as a specific labor 
standard to be met.129 In addition, both agreements encourage the nations 
to proactively and cooperatively address new or particularly resilient labor 
problems, such as child exploitation.130 
 
 
Agreement probably did not precipitate this change in Jordanian labor law, although free trade 
negotiations may have played some role. 
 122. Id. 
 123. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, KAV 6375, available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html 
[hereinafter U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement]. 
 124. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl. May 18, 2004, KAV 7141, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/ 
Section_ Index.html [hereinafter U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement]. 
 125. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 123; U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 
supra note 124. 
 126. See Manley & Lauredo, supra note 46, at 98. 
 127. Compare U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 123, Ch. 18 (Labour), and U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 124, Ch. 18 (Labour), with U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 104, art. 6. Even a glance at the three treaties leads the viewer to conclude that 
later trade agreements are more detailed than their predecessors. 
 128. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 123, Ch. 18; U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 124, Ch. 18. 
 129. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 123, arts. 18.6, 18.8(d); U.S.-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement, supra note 124, art. 18.7. 
 130. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 123, Annex 18.5; U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 124, art. 18.5. The continuing trend towards emphasizing child labor as a 
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There is no evidence that U.S. free trade agreements with Chile and 
Australia have had a beneficial impact on child labor rates in either 
country. In Chile, which collects and reports child labor data, incidences 
of the worst forms of child labor actually increased after the U.S.-Chile 
Free Trade Agreement was signed.131 Thus, the U.S.-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement has not resulted in a dramatic decrease in exploitative child 
labor but, in fact, may be correlated with its rise.  
Unlike Chile, Australia does not collect child labor statistics per se.132 
The rate of workplace injuries to Australian children, however, suggests 
that child labor is more than an incidental problem.133 In addition, each of 
the worst forms of child labor, including child soldiers, likely occurred in 
Australia as recently as 2004.134 Australia has no national child labor 
laws135 and was much criticized for its long-time refusal to ratify ILO 
Convention Nos. 138 and 182.136 When the United States could have 
leveraged trade liberalization to force Australia to improve its child labor 
 
 
discrete area of workers’ rights is evident in the location of the labor cooperation mechanism in the 
agreement. In the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, the labor cooperation mechanism is included in 
an Annex. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 123, Annex 18.5. A similar clause is found in 
the body of the later-negotiated U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement. U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 124, art. 18.5, suggesting that the labor provisions were thought to be more 
central to the agreement than before. 
 131. In 2003, the ILO estimated that three and one half percent of five-to-fourteen year-old 
Chileans were employed. U.S. DOL 2005 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR, supra 
note 59, at 166.  
 In 2005, the United States Department of Labor noted that employment of Chilean boys in 
sexually-exploitative jobs was on the rise. Id. (citing ECPAT International, Chile, in ECPAT 
INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 14, 2004, Child Prostitution, available at http://www.ecpat.net/eng/Ecpat_inter/ 
projects/monitoring/online_database/index.asp (follow “Chile” hyperlink; then follow “profile of 
commercial sexual exploitation of children” hyperlink; then follow “show” hyperlink)). 
 132. In its advisory paper to the United States on the proposed U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, the AFL-CIO noted that “the Australian Government has refused to make any 
commitments to ensuring effective collection, monitoring and analysis of data related to the ‘worst 
forms of child labor.’” AFL-CIO, Labor Rights and Child Labor Laws in Australia 4 (Sept. 2, 2003), 
available at http://www.actu.labor.net.au/public/papers/laborrights/australia_labor_rights_comments_ 
02_09_2003.rtf [hereinafter AFL-CIO, Labor Rights]. 
 133. According to the Australian National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 21,000 
Australian children under fifteen years of age reported work-related injuries or ailments to that agency 
in 2001. National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (Austl.), Hospitalisations due to Work-
Related Injury in Australia (2001–2002) 4–5 (2004), available at http://www.ascc.gov.au/NR/ 
rdonlyres/C65C38F4-4BD(-45A9-8601-FF7FA013ED2B/0/NHMDReport200001.pdf. For the same 
period, an additional 310,000 injuries were reported by workers between fifteen and twenty-one years 
of age. Id. See also Australian Clearinghouse for Youth Studies, Australian Youth Facts and Stats, 
http://www.youthfacts.com.au/index.php?option=displaypage &Itemid=253&op=page#injuries01 (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2007).  
 134. AFL-CIO, Labor Rights, supra note 132, at 4–7. 
 135. Parkinson II, supra note 36, at 7.  
 136. Id. Australia finally ratified ILO Convention No. 182 in 2006 but has yet to ratify ILO 
Convention No. 132. See supra note 36. 
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laws, it instead gave Australia an easy out. The U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement explicitly states that Australia’s obligation to protect children’s 
“internationally recognized labor . . . rights” is met “through laws . . . that 
regulate age levels for compulsory education.”137 The fiction perpetuated 
by the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, that child labor does not 
happen in these Westernized countries, impairs efforts to eradicate child 
labor by perpetuating the myth that child labor is the curse of less-
developed nations.138 
3. Round Three: Peru,139 Colombia140 and Perpetuity 
Both Peru and Colombia admit they have moderate child labor 
problems.141 In 2006, President George W. Bush sent the ATPA to 
Congress for ratification.142 Unlike its predecessors, the ATPA’s child 
labor provisions are not innovative. Instead, the social clause in the ATPA 
is virtually identical to those in the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Australia Free 
Trade Agreements.143 That is, the parties agree to enforce their own child 
labor laws in a manner consistent with ILO Convention No. 182.144 The 
ATPA has not yet been ratified by the United States Congress and may be 
politically stalled.145 Shortly after their victory in the 2006 election, 
Congressional Democrats asked the Office of the United States Trade 
 
 
 137. U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 124, art. 18.7(1), nn.18–65. 
 138. See, e.g., Ahmed, supra note 27, at 153–55 (discussing the difference in labor protections 
found in more developed and less developed countries); ASDCI, supra note 10, at 4. 
 139. PTPA, supra note 73. 
 140. CTPA, supra note 73. 
 141. The most recent statistics available about Peruvian child labor date from 1994, when 16.5% 
of all Peruvian children between six and fourteen years old were employed. U.S. DOL 2005 FINDINGS 
ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR, supra note 59, at 496. Both poverty and poor educational 
opportunities present significant problems in Peru. Id. Colombian child labor rates are slightly lower, 
with an estimated 10.4% of children between five and fourteen years of age employed. Id. at 172. 
 142. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Colombia Sign 
Trade Promotion Agreement (Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_ 
Releases/2006/November/United_States_Colombia_Sign_Trade_Promotion_Agreement.html; Press 
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Peru Sign Trade Promotion 
Agreement (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006/ 
April/United_States_Peru_Sign_Trade_Promotion_Agreement.html. 
 143. Compare U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 123, Ch. 18, and U.S.-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement, supra note 124, Ch. 18, with PTPA, supra note 73, Ch. 17 and CTPA, supra note 
73, Ch. 18. 
 144. CTPA, supra note 73, art. 17.5; PTPA, supra note 73, art. 17.5. 
 145. See Snubs and Opportunities; Latin America and the United States, ECONOMIST (U.S. 
Edition), Nov. 25, 2006, at 37–38. 
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Representative to reopen talks with Colombia and Peru to address 
concerns about labor rights.146 
With the fate of the ATPA unknown, the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative is in the process of negotiating nine more free trade 
agreements.147 Some of the countries with which the United States is 
negotiating, such as Thailand, are well-known havens for child 
exploitation.148 To curb pervasive child labor with a free trade agreement, 
it is vital that the content and enforcement of the social clause be faultless. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Child labor is a growing international problem.149 Existing U.S. free 
trade agreements do not do enough to reduce and eliminate child labor. 
Although the United States has noticeably improved enforcement 
mechanisms in free trade agreements since NAALC, commensurate 
development in the substance of the child labor provisions has not 
occurred. In emphasizing national sovereignty, U.S. free trade agreements 
substitute formalistic enforcement and anti-degradation requirements for 
empirical standards.  
Assuming, as this Note does, that U.S. free trade agreements can effect 
real and positive change in the lives of exploited child workers, the 
question becomes how best to improve social clauses. The trend towards 
substituting boilerplate language to describe vague principles in lieu of 
standards adapted to national conditions is troubling and should not be 
perpetuated by the United States.  
Human rights experts agree that national solutions are necessary to 
eliminate child labor.150 In fact, this is precisely what makes regional 
 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the United States is 
currently negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with Malaysia, Oman, Panama, the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea), Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Updates on the trade negotiations may 
be accessed on the United States Trade Representative’s website, http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Section_Index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). Information about the United States’ current 
negotiation of multilateral free trade agreements with the Enterprise for ASEAN, the South African 
Customs Union, and the FTAA, may be accessed at http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/ 
Section_Index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). 
 148. Kern, supra note 14, at 181. Thailand is rife with child prostitution. Id. In Bangkok alone, an 
estimated 800,000 girls under the age of fifteen labor as prostitutes. Id. at 181 (citing Jodi L. Jacobson, 
Yes Slavery, WORLD WATCH 34 (Jan/Feb. 1992)). 
 149. See, e.g., Senser, supra note 16. 
 150. ILO, The End of Child Labour: Within Reach, Global Report under the Follow-Up to the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 10 (2006), available at http://www.ilo. 
org/public/English/standars/relm/ilc/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf. According to the ILO, “it is the policy choices 
made by governments rather than poverty levels alone that explain why certain countries have 
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programs to eliminate child labor, such as those found in U.S. free trade 
agreements, so effective. A free trade agreement that uses boilerplate 
language to describe child labor protections forfeits the benefits afforded 
by a regional solution. The United States must not succumb to the 
temptation of addressing the important problem of child labor with easy 
and uncontroversial boilerplate language. Instead, the United States must 
condition future free trade agreements upon the development and 
implementation of programs that will concretely address a nation’s actual 
child labor problem. 
The shift to specific, objective, and measurable standards is a natural 
outgrowth of abandoning boilerplate language. Nebulous principles allow 
nations to abuse the privilege of free trade with the United States by not 
complying with its conditions. To avoid the danger of similar 
manipulation of finite and detailed standards, the United States must add 
specific goals for the gradual reduction and elimination of child labor to its 
free trade agreements. Assessment of the suitability of continuing trade 
should be tied to deadlines for achievement of these child labor reduction 
goals. In this way, the United States may harness the free trade 
agreement’s power to effect real social change and avoid becoming 
trapped in a perpetual free trade agreement with a noncompliant nation. 
In order to set specific and measurable goals for the gradual 
elimination of child labor, reliable child labor statistics must be collected. 
The dearth of valid and reliable information about child labor rates151 must 
be rectified. The United States could condition free trade upon the regular 
collection and reporting of child labor data, though such a direct 
requirement may be seen as impermissibly impairing national sovereignty. 
Alternatively, U.S. free trade agreements could require participation in the 
ILO’s Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labor 
(SIMPOC).152 Thus, the United States would both avoid the appearance of 
 
 
managed to reach a critical threshold in achieving universal education and with it child labour 
elimination.” Id. See also ILO, Facts on Child Labour 2 (2006), available at  http://www.ilo.org/ 
public/english/standards/ipec/about/globalreport/2006/download/2006_fs_childlabour_en.pdf; Ahmed, 
supra note 28, at 162; JENNIFER FEE, LESSONS LEARNED WHEN INVESTIGATING THE WORST FORMS OF 
CHILD LABOUR USING THE RAPID ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 6–7 (2004) (discussing the importance 
of local and national buy-in the collection of child labor data). 
 151. FEE, supra note 150, at iii. Child labor statistics are difficult to collect because of the 
“hidden, sometimes illegal or even criminal nature” of child labor and, consequently, are not always 
valid indicators of a nation’s actual child labor rates. Id. 
 152. ILO, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour: IPEC, Child Labour 
Statistics, SIMPOC, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/index.htm (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2007). SIMPOC helps nations collect valid data on child labor rates using a variety of 
methods including rapid assessment, which is designed to ferret out covert child labor. Id. 
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impeding another nation’s sovereignty and ensure the availability of 
reliable child labor statistics for assessing the propriety of continuing free 
trade. To do so, the United States likely would need to improve its own 
child labor surveys, a small price to pay for major strides towards 
eliminating child labor. 
V. CONCLUSION 
U.S. free trade agreements offer a viable approach for eliminating child 
labor. These free trade agreements are in danger, however, of succumbing 
to the Siren’s call of easy and uncontroversial boilerplate language. If the 
United States intends to leverage the economic spoils of free trade to 
eradicate child labor, it must improve the substantive child labor 
provisions in its free trade agreements. First, the United States must insist 
on child labor clauses adapted to the relevant national and regional 
stressors which actually cause the problem. Such country-specific drafting 
must include specialized, measurable, and enforceable child labor 
standards. Second, continued free trade with the United States must be 
conditioned upon concrete reductions in child labor rates. Third, to aid in 
the development of reasonable goals, the United States must also require 
the regular collection of child labor data through a program such as the 
SIMPOC.  
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